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Policymakers charged with responsibility for monetary
policy take it as self evident that their policy actions have
an impact on the real economy in the short-run. Profes-
sional economics journals, on the other hand, are filled
with models of equilibrium business cycles that imply
systematic monetary policies have no real effects. While
most economists would agree that monetary actionscan-
and do-have real effects on the macro-economy, they
disagree on the exact role that money plays in the economy
and why money seems to matter.
Business cycle theories in the Keynesian tradition as-
sumethat monetary disturbances affect real output because
wages and prices adjust slowly in the face of economic
shocks. Changes in the nominal quantity of money gener-
ate changes in the real quantity of money-the nominal
quantity adjusted for the level of prices-since prices are
sticky.Fluctuations in the real supply of money then affect
interest rates and aggregate spending.
In sharp contrast, equilibrium business cycle theories
assume wages and prices adjust continually to ensure that
markets are in equilibrium. In most equilibrium models,
thereal effects of monetary fluctuations are typically either
nonexistent or arise only when individuals have incorrect
information about the current stock of money.
Economists also disagree on the role playedby financial
intermediaries. Some economists incline to the view that
financial intermediaries are a "veil" in the sense that they
re-package financial assets but do not affect real savings or
investment behavior.Others emphasize that financial inter-
mediaries can have real effects on economic resource
allocation. This divergence of opinion is significant for the
bearing it has on the debate about the role of monetary
policy. An understanding of the roles of both money and
financial intermediaries is necessary for evaluating and
designing both macroeconomic monetary policy and bank
regulatory policy.
In this article, we discuss how the behavior of financial
intermediaries-and that of banks, in particular-may
have an influence on real economic activity and how,
through its impact on banks, monetary policy influences
economic activity! The objective of this article is not to
present a complete survey of recent developments in the
economics of financial intermediaries. Rather, the article
focuses on developments that promise to advance our
19understanding of the roles played by both financial inter-
mediaries and monetary policy. The emphasis is almost
exclusively on the macroeconomic impact of intermedi-
aries, and the discussion is limited to equilibrium models
of the business cycle." Specifically, this article examines
some of the channels through which systematic monetary
policy will have real effects even when prices adjust
quickly.
Sections I and II examine the role played by the liability
side of the banking sector's balance sheet. Bank deposits
are an important component of the medium of exchange,
and variations in the quantity of bank deposits may affect
economic activity. Section I discusses one recent approach
in the economics literature that allows some role for major
disruptions in the banking sector to affect the economy,but
in which monetary policy itself has no effect. on real
activity. Section II discusses other recent work that exam-
ines more closely the determinants of the demand for bank
deposits and concludes that monetary policy actions may
have real effects via their impact on bank liabilities.
Section III turns to the asset side of the banking sector's
balance sheet. Recent work that attempts to account for the
economic role played by financial intermediaries is re-
viewed. One conclusionfrom this work is that variations in
the supply of intermediated credit can affect the level of
economic activity. The effect of monetary policy on
supply of bank-intermediated credit is then discussed.
Conclusions are summarized in Section IV.
I. Transactions Services in Real Business Cycle Models
Charts I and 2 show that fluctuations in the money
supply and fluctuations in the general level of real eco-
nomic activity exhibit a high degree of association. In
Chart I, deviations of real GNP and MI around trend are
plotted using quarterly data for the period 1960.1 to
1987.4. Chart 2 plots the growth rates of Ml and real GNP.
It is easy to see why monetary disturbances have played a
majorrole intheories of the business cycle. Disagreements
arise over whether this close association should be inter-
preted as evidence that monetary fluctuations have helped
to cause business cycles, or whether both output and
money supply movements are caused by nonmonetary
economic disturbances.
The economics profession recently has seen the develop-
ment of a body of work that employs stochastic growth
models of competitive economies as a stylistic framework
within which to study business cycles. For example,
Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Long and Plosser (1983)
studied business cycles as induced responses to real pro-
ductivity shocks in models of economies that exclude any
role for money. Because they ignore monetary factors as
possible sources of cycles, these "real business cycle
models" contrast strongly with models that focus on mone-
tary disturbances as the major cause of cyclical fluctua-
tions (for example, Lucas, 1975).
Chart 1
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Economic Review / Fall 1988In an important paper, King and Plosser (1984) intro-
duce money into a real business cycle model. In their
model, the sources of business cycles are entirely non-
monetary. Money does not cause cycles. But their model
does predict a positive correlation between real output and
monetary aggregates, like Ml , that incorporate both out-
side money (the liabilities of the central bank) and inside
money (the liabilities of the banking sector).
King and Plosser focus on the financial sector as a
producer of transaction services that are used by firms and
consumers in the process of production and the purchase of
goods and services. Variations in the total output of goods
and services generate positively correlated movements in
the demand for transactions services. These changes in
demand then induce similar movements in the actual sup-
ply of transaction services, leadingto a positive correlation
between measures of transaction services and real output
during the course of a business cycle.
To account for the observed co-movements of real
output and the stock of deposits at banks, it is necessary to
provide some link between deposits and the quantity of
transactions services produced by the financial industry.
An economic rationale for such a tie is not straightforward,
as Fama (1980) points out. King and Plosser skirtthis issue
by assuming that transaction services are linked directly to
the stock of deposits held by the banking sector. Thus, by
construction, the positive co-movement of output and
transaction services translates into a positive co-movement
between output and bank deposits. Inside money and out-
put move together even though monetary factors have no
causal role in generating business cycles.
This reverse causality argument-s-output causes money
and money does not cause output-is not new. See, for
example, Tobin (1971). But and Plosser extend the
argument by showing that their model implies measures of
inside money, such as real bank deposits, should be more
highly correlated with measures of real economic activity
than are measures of outside money, and they present some
evidence that such is the case in the U.S.
In the King and Plosser model, both individuals and
banks care only about the real value of their asset holdings
and the real value of the transaction services produced by
the payments system. There is no money illusion; individ-
uals do not care about nominal values. Consequently,
changes in the nominal quantity outside money simply
result in proportional variations in the aggregate price
level, leaving all real variables unaffected. Monetary pol-
icy,which varies the path ofoutside money,has importance
only for the price level. Thus, a change in the stock of
outside money does not affect the real value of bankassets
or liabilities.
The neutrality of money holds in their model even if the
variations in the path of outside money induce changes in
the expected rate of inflation. An increase in the money
supply that is viewed as only temporary, for example,
would raise the current price level relative to future prices
and generateexpectationsoffuture deflation. Such changes
will cause nominal interest rates to adjust, but in the model
Chart :2
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Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 21of King and Plosser these nominal rate adjustments leave
all real rates of return on interest bearing instruments
unchanged. Since outside money is non-interest bearing, a
rise in the expected rate of inflation reduces its real return.
The resulting fall in the demand for outside money would
be eliminated by an immediaterise in the price level, there-
by reducing the real supply of outside money.3
Unfortunately, the empirical evidence that King and
Plosser present to support their model is weak. For exam-
ple, correlations between outside money, inside money,
and real economic activity are very dependent on the way
has been conducted. money has
never been used as a policy target by the Federal IIp,,pnrp
but instead has been allowed to fluctuate in a manner
consistent with the Fed's interest rate or monetary aggre-
gate targets. Thus, the relative strength of the correlation
of outside money with measures of real activity does not
necessarily provide much information on King and Plos-
ser's hypothesis. In fact, King and Plosser actually demon-
strate that the exact relationship between the monetary
base, the stock of currency, the stock of inside money, and
the price level will depend on the presence or absence of
reserve requirements and the particular aggregate targeted
by the central bank.
Moreover, King and Plosser choose to ignore one chan-
nel in their model by which monetary variables could have
effects on real economic activity. Because transaction serv-
ices-thebanking sector's output-areused as inputs into
the production of other goods and services, a real shock to
the banking sector can have real effects on production in
other sectors. Thus, a major disruption of the payments
system, such as occurred during the of massive
bank failures in the early 1930s, would contribute to a fall
in real output by lowering the quantity of an important in-
put into production." Bernanke's 1983 study of the impact
of intermediation during the Great Depression provides
some empirical evidence relevant to this issue. Bernanke
showed that measures of the liabilities of failing banks
enter in real estimated
the 1920s 1930s, even when measures of the money
supply also are included.5
If the transaction services provided by bank deposits are
an important determinant of the general level of economic
activity, then more mild fluctuations in the stock of bank
deposits than those accompanying majorbank failures also
may produce general economic fluctuations. Substitution
between bank deposits and other financial assets might
then affect economic activity. King and Plosser ignore this
channel from monetary variables to real variables on the
grounds that it is likely to be unimportant empirically.
Whether, in fact, such an effect is small enough to neglect
will depend on the nonbank sector's demand for liquid
assets.
n. Bank Liabilities and the Medium of Exchange
Until recently, economists studying the microeconomic
foundations of the demand fortransaction services concen-
trated on the demand for outside money (the liabilities of
the central bank). In some of the earlier literature, such as
the Baumol and Tobin transactions costs models, there was
an explicit recognition that interest bearing assets were an
alternative to non-interest bearing money as a store of
value so that the interest yield on those assets represented
the opportunity cost of using money to fund transactions.
models did not to explain non-
interest bearing money was used to effect transactions, and
in that sense, the microeconomic foundations of the
demand for money partly unexplained.
In any event, changes in expected inflation induced by
monetary policy will lead market interest rates to adjust
and cause substitution between interest bearing bank de-
posits (inside money) and non-interest bearing outside
money.Consequently, the real impact of monetary disturb-
ances may depend on the properties of bank liabilities as
medium of exchange substitutes for outside money. This
suggests that the liability side of the banking sector's bal-
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ance sheet may be important in determining the impact of
monetary policy.
In recent years, the overlapping generations model of
Samuelson (1958) has been the most popular way of ex-
plaining the role of money in intermediating transactions.
This model suggests that money is needed to facilitate spa-
tially or temporally-separated transactions since anyone
generation is unable to arrange trades with all successive
generations without the use of some "money-like" asset. 6
A difficulty with these models is that leave unex-
plainedthe use of non-interest bearing outside money to fi-
nance transactions when interest bearing inside money
also is available.
Bryant and Wallace (1984) appeal to legal restrictions on
private intermediation to explain the co-existence of cur-
rency and interest bearing default-free bonds. Interest
bearing default-free bonds are unsuitable for financing
many transactions because of the bonds' large denomina-
tions. Legal restrictions prevent intermediaries from creat-
ing a better medium of exchange by issuing default-free
small denomination claims to such bonds.
Economic Review / Summer 1988Bryant and Wallace use their model to examine the
interactions between such legal restrictions and monetary
policy. In effect, the legal restrictions and the use of both
currency and bonds to fund transactions permitthe govern-
ment to levy a non-linear inflation tax. The real equilib-
rium their model achieves is not independent of either
monetary policy or the institutional factors explaining the
demand for currency and intermediary liabilities. Howev-
er,these effects depend solely upon the nature of the legal
restrictions on intermediary behavior and may not be
intrinsic to all economies in which financial intermediaries
issue inside money.
Another strand of the recent literature on the demand for
monetary assets has focused on the cash-in-advance con-
straint model of liquidity. Drawing on a suggestion of
Clower (1967), Lucas developed a formal model
the transaction services provided by money by assuming
money balances were required to finance purchases of con-
sumption goods. Goods couldbe exchanged for money and
money for goods, but goods could not be exchanged for
goods. Also, purchases were limited by the cash in hand at
the time of purchase and could not be paid for by a sub-
sequent exchange of interest bearing assets. In Lucas and
Stokey (1983), the model was further elaborated to allow
for two categories of goods. Some goods could only be pur-
chased with cash, while other goods could be paid for with
a subsequent exchange of interest bearing assets. In Lucas
(1984), consumers can hold interest bearing state-con-
tingent "securities" in addition to money. While the se-
curities bear interest, they can be exchanged only at
infrequent intervals and therefore are not very useful for
financing consumption.
These ideas are developed further in Svensson (1985)
and Hartley (1988). In Hartley's model, consumers can use
either cash or interest-bearing "deposits" to purchase
some goods, while other goods can only be purchased with
cash. Consumers also can hold interest-bearing state-
contingent securities. Cash and deposits are more liquid
than securities in that only the former can be used at any
to effect . Cash is more than deposits
because it caneffect a wider range of purchases. While the
liquidity return is highest forcash and absentfor securities,
the explicit interest payments are highest on securities and
absent for cash. This inverse relationship between liquidity
and interest yield suggests that changes in the nominal
interest payments on deposits or securities will affect the
demand for all three assets. As a result, monetary policy,
by changing the anticipated rate of growth of base money,
will have real effects by altering the demands for the dif-
ferent categories of financial assets.
Englund and Svensson (1986) examine banking in a
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
general equilibrium to Lucas, Svensson,
and Hartley models. They that changes in the credit
multiplier, or "banking sector shocks," will have real
effects, but one-time changes in the level of base money
will affect only prices. In the macroeconomic model exam-
ined in Hartley and Walsh (1986), one-time changes in the
level of the base money supply also are neutral, whereas
temporary changes in the levelof the base, or changes in its
rate ofgrowth, will have real effects by inducing substitu-
tion between holdings of inside and outside money.
Economists typically rule out the real effects of infla-
tion-induced portfolio substitution (Tobin effects) on the
grounds that they are likely to be unimportant empirically.
Forexample, this is the position taken by King and Plosser.
This is a reasonable assumption concerning direct sub-
stitution between money on the part of the
economy's wealth holders. However, the real effects of
monetary shocks in Hartley and Walsh are driven by
substitution among monetary assets such as currency and
bank deposits. The elasticity of substitution among dif-
ferent monetary assets is likely to be large, even if the
elasticity of substitution between portfolio holdings of
capital and liquid assets as a whole is esentially zero.
While the microeconomic models that allow roles for
both outside and inside money as mediums of exchange are
far from complete, they all suggest that monetary policy
could have significant aggregate real effects in equilibrium
models of the business cycle. In general, these effects arise
by altering the relative demands for different liquid assets.
As consumers substitute between different liquid assets as
mediums of exchange, interest rates are affected and the
flow of "savings" to investment may be altered.
Thus, even inequilbrium models of business CVC:le--
models in which prices move in response to per-
ceived monetary disturbances-the role of bank liabilities
in the payments system, and their substitutability for
outside money plays a role in determining the impact of
monetary policy on the real economy.
This discussion has focused on the liability side of the
banking sector's balance and on banks as producers
of transaction services. Banks, however, also provide
portfolio management services. hold deposits
in order to gain access to the system and the
transaction services banks provide, and these deposits
represent claims against the assets held by the bank. Thus,
it makes sense to consider the asset side of the banking
sector's balance sheet and banks' role as suppliers of credit
as a key channel of the impact of monetary policy. To
understand this potential channel monetary policy
actions, it is necessary to understand the role of banks as
suppliers of credit.
23III. Increasing Returns, Financial Intermediaries, and Credit
Variations in the demand forcurrency and bank deposits
may affect the total volume of bank liabilities and, as a
result, lead to variations in the volume of bank lending. An
increased demand for currency, for example, may produce
a decline in bank lending. But while banks are distin-
guished by the transaction accounts they offer, banks are
not the only intermediaries that supply credit, and the
impact on the total supply of credit due to a reduction in
bank lending will depend on how easily borrowers can
replace bank loans with credit from nonbank sources.
Changes in volume of bank loans will havethe greatest
impact on economic activity when there is something
"special" about bank credit.
This section begins with a discussion of an environment
in which bank credit has no special characteristics that dis-
tinguish it from other sources of credit and in which finan-
cial intermediaries are unimportant for the determination
ofreal economic activity. Then, some recent work that fo-
cuses on the role played by intermediaries is discussed.
This work suggests there may be something special about
bank credit. If this is the case, monetary policy is likely to
affect economic activity through its impact on bank
lending.
Suppose, as in the real businesscycle model of King and
Plosser, that banks face constant returns to scale as pro-
viders of portfolio management services. In this case,
banks will care only about the management fees they earn,
and not about the composition of the portfolio of assets
they hold. Banks "simply cater to the tastes and oppor-
tunities of suppliers of securities and demanders of depos-
its. Thus, the real activity that takes place, the way it is
financed, and the prices of securities and goods are not
controlled either by individual banks or by the banking
sector." (Fama 1980, pA8)
The size of the intermediation industry can undergo
proportional expansions and/or contractions without hav-
ing any effect on the relative prices of different assets.
Assetprices and the financing of real economic activity are
determined by the behavior of the economy's savers. They
ultimately hold the economy's assets, whether they do so
directly or indirectly by holding the liabilities of the
financial intermediaries. When returns to scale are con-
stant, shifts in the public's demand for the liabilities of
intermediaries have no real effects; a reduced demand for
these liabilities shrinks the assets held by intermediaries,
but the affected assets can instead simply be held directly
in the public's portfolio.
Reserve requirements presenta potential problem in this
framework. Reserve requirements force institutions subject
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to such regulations to hold some of their assets in the form
of non-interest bearing assets or, in some countries, in the
form of low interest rate government securities. Reserve
requirements impose a tax on the banking sector, and drive
a wedge between the return on banks' portfolio of assets
and the return paid to depositors. With constant returns to
scale, the demand for the portfolio management services of
intermediaries subject to a reserve requirement would fall
to zero. Individuals would prefer to hold assets directly
rather than use the portfolio services of the intermediary.
Banks would not be able to pass this reserve requirement
tax on to the consumers of their portfolio management
services.
King and Plosser argue that such a reserve requirement
tax will lead to higherdeposit service fees-thatis, fees for
access to the payments system will rise. As a result, the
demand for bank deposits will fall, and the banking sector
will contract. However, in the model of King and Plosser,
variations in the size of the banking sector havenoeffect on
the real allocation of credit or the financing of real eco-
nomic activity. Either financial intermediaries not subject
to reserve requirements will expand to offset the shrinkage
of the banking sector or individuals will hold the liabilities
of the economy's ultimate borrowers directly.
Fama (1985) recently has argued, however, that the
reserve tax seems to be borne by bank borrowers, not by
bank depositors. This implies that there is something
"special" about bank loans [see also James (1988)]. Bor-
rowers are willing to pay more to obtain a loan from a bank
than from a nonbank source of credit. But this uniqueness
of bank loans seems at odds with the view that intermedia-
tion is simply a veil behind which real activity is con-
ducted, or that variations in bank-intermediated credit can
be offset by the actions of nonbank intermediaries.
If bank credit is special, monetary policy actions that
affect the size of the banking sector will have an impact on
real economic activity. Thus, an increase in reserve re-
quirements, for example, would shrink bank credit and
force firms to switch to less attractive sources of funds.
This would raise the net cost of funds in the economy and
lead to a fall in aggregate investment activity.
Tounderstand fully the role of banks in determining the
effectiveness of monetary policy, it is necessary toexamine
more closely why bank loans might be special. In King and
Plosser's model, asset choices of banks play no real
economic role. A very different view of financial inter-
mediaries emerges from another body of recent reserarch
which includes papers by Boyd and Prescott (1986), Ber-
nanke (1983), Bernanke and Gertler (1986), Stiglitz and
Economic Review / Fall 1988Weiss (1981), and Williamson (1986a, 1986b). These pa-
pers all attempt to provide economic explanations for the
endogenous development of such institutions as financial
intermediaries (both bank and nonbank).
Two characteristics of economic transactions are suffi-
cient to generate the presence of intermediaries: asym-
metric information and increasing returns to scale. The
exact manner in which these two characteristics interact
has been modelled differently by different authors. For
example,Williamson (1986b) develops a model in which
entrepreneurs have access to a technology that requires a
fixed investment and yields a random real return, the
expected value of which is known by both borrowers and
lenders. The actual realization of the random return is
known (expost) to the entrepreneur, but other individuals
can obtain information on the realized return only by
incurring a fixed cost to monitor each project. The pres-
ence of fixed monitoring costs makes it costly for individ-
ual investors to attempt to diversify by lending to many
different borrowers. Moreover, the projects are assumed to
be sufficiently large relative to individual wealth that en-
trepreneurs must gain access to the savings of several indi-
viduals in order to carry out their investment projects.
This rudimentary framework is sufficient to generate a
role for intermediaries. Since the project's actual return is
known only by the entrepreneur, in the absence of monitor-
ing, the entrepreneur always has an incentive to report a
low return to his creditors and abscond with the profits. To
prevent this behavior, each of the individual investors who
finances a project must incur the monitoring cost. A large
intermediary, on the other hand, can finance a large num-
ber of projects and incur the fixed cost of monitoring only
once for each project. The intermediary is able to exploit
the increasing returns to scale implicit in the fixed-cost
monitoring technology. In addition, the intermediary's
ability to fund a large number of projects permits diver-
sification of nonsystematic risks. Ifthere is no systematic
risk, a large intermediary can offer a certain return to its
depositors. 7
Information asymmetries also give rise to debt con-
tracts between lenders and entrepreneurs. In Williamson's
model, the optimal contract can be shown to involve a
fixed payment to the lender if the project return exceeds
some critical value R*. If the actual return is less than R*,
the lender receives the entire return. In other words, the
borrower pays a fixed rate of interest on the loan if the
return exceeds R*; otherwise the entrepreneur declares
bankruptcy and the intermediary recovers the entrepre-
neur's assets, which will be worth less than R*. This
contract minimizes monitoring costs since the entrepre-
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
neur has no incentive to lie if the actual return is greater
than R*.
The introduction of financial intermediaries in the pres-
ence of asymmetric information and monitoring costs
leads to increasing returns to scale from intermediation. In
contrast to the viewof intermediation as a constant-return-
to-scale industry, increasing returns imply that the levelof
intermediation has an impact on real activity, the waythat
activity is financed, and the prices of securities and goods.
This is particularly apparent if the equilibrium involves
credit rationing (Williamson, 1986a).
Although these models help to explain why intermedia-
tion matters, they do not explain why banks might be
special and therefore, why monetary policy might havereal
effects. One reason is that banks are both lenders and
providers of transaction services. Banks have informa-
tional advantages that result in lower monitoring costs
because they simultaneously lend to and maintain the
transaction accounts of firms. The firm's transactions ac-
count provides the bank with low cost information about
the firm. A nonbank intermediary lacking this source of
information faces higher monitoring costs. In this case,
banks are able to supply credit more efficiently than can
other intermediaries. Consequently, if monetary policy
affects the size of the banking sector, it also will affect the
level of real economic activity.
While the economic role of intermediaries seems more
fully developed in the asymmetric information literature,
the real business cycle research has, somewhat paradox-
ically, provided a much more detailed analysis of the
impact of monetary policy.8 One attempt to bridge this gap.
is developed in Hartley and Walsh (1986), which supple-
ments a conventional ad hocmacroeconomic model with a
banking sector that makes loans to finance real investment
spending. This framework permits the study of the macro
implications of intermediation when intermediation mat-
ters. They show that monetary policy has real effects when
changes in expected inflation induce substitution between
bank liabilities and non-interest bearing outside money.
Equal changes in all nominal interest rates (in order to
restore expected real rates) alter the relative demands for
non-interest bearing outside money and interest bearing
inside money. Both the market for bank deposits and the
market for outside money are affected, and adjustments in
the price level cannot restore equilibrium to both markets
simultaneously. As a result, real interest rates must adjust.
Movements in the rate on bank deposits then lead to
changes in the supply of bank loans and bank loan rates
that affect the level of real economic activity. Unlike the
case considered by King and Plosser in which returns to
25scale in intermediation are constant, changes in the quan-
tity of bank credit are not fully offset by changes in credit
suppliedby nonbank intermediaries or by changes in direct
lending by lnnnl1,ill51d"
Additional which monetary policy can
affect real activity arise when bank liabilities are subjectto
reserve requirements. reducing the nonbank sector's
demand for outside money, an increase in expected infla-
tion increases the supply reserves available to the
bankmg sector. Since reserves can be viewed as an input in
the intermediation process under a fractional reserve sys-
tem, an increase in expected inflation allows the banking
sector to the of loans. This reduces the
equilibrium loan rate and leads to a rise in real investment.
Shocks to the banking sector have effects on the level of
real economic activity, because they affect the supply
of loans. In Williamson's model of intermediation, for
example, disturbances work through the asset side of the
banking sector's balance sheet. In contrast, disturbances to
banks in King and Plosser's model can have real effects
only if they influence the provision of transaction services.
Real effects arise, not because of variations on the asset
side of banks' balance sheets, but because of variations on
the liability side to the role bank deposits as a means
ofpayment.
Several recent have been made to determine
whether it is bank credit (the asset side) or money (bank
liabilities) that matters for real economic activity. Ber-
nanke (1983) found that for the 1920s and 1930s money had
effects on real output even after controlling for credit.
Empiricalevidence from post-wardatais reported by King
(1986) and Bernanke (1986). King finds little support for
the role of credit as the transmission mechanism for
monetary policy. In vector autoregressions (VARs) that
include real GNP, demand deposits, and various measures
of bank loans, demand account for a
much higher fraction of the variance of GNP forecasts
errors than do any of the loan variables. Since King's
measure of money-demand deposits-is a measure of
inside money, these results seem most consistent with the
real business cycle view.
Bernanke (1986) obtained somewhat results
when he used a structural model to identify underlying
money and credit shocks in a VAR that included, in
addition to Ml and a measure of credit, real GNP, real
defense spending, and the monetary base. Based on a
decomposition of the output forecast error variance, credit
shocks appearedto be much more importantthan shocks to
the monetary base (outside money). Ml and credit shocks
were of roughly equal importance. These results make it
clearthat few generally agreed upon empirical regulantres
exist in this area,
IV. Conclusions
Recent research in monetary economics that has focused
on the role of information asymmetries and the costs of
monitoring provide an improved understanding of the role
offinancial intermediaries. research highlights three
characteristics intermediaries that seem of special im-
portance from the of understanding the role
played by monetary policy in equilibrium models of busi-
ness cycles. when intermediation is modeled as a
constant-returns-to-scale (as in the real business
cycle model of King and the asset side of the
banking sector's is irrelevant for real eco-
nomic activity. Variations in bank-intermediated credit are
offset by other or portfolio adjust-
ments on the of lnrlnl1,rlllClI"
Second, the bank liabilities as a means
of payment the impact of
monetary policy. policy can induce individuals
to substitute between bank deposits and outside money.
These portfolio will relative rates of return and
real economic of the portfolio
adjustments caused in the relative yields of
bank deposits and outside money depend on the
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transaction properties of currency and bank deposits, and
the characteristics of the payments system.
Third, if bank loans are special, perhaps due to the
information efficiencies attributed to the banking sector's
role as a provider of both credit and transaction services,
then variations in the banking sector's aggregate lending
will have an impact on real economic activity. Monetary
policy will influence the real economy through its influence
on the supply of bank . Variations in the path
of outside money that induce changes in infla-
tion will result in nominal rate adjustments,
such adjustments generally will affect real rates and will
thereby affect the supply of bank
Iffinancial intermediaries form a veil behind
which real activity takes place, the resolution of many of
the issues faced by economic policymakers is quite simple.
If real activity, and the way it is financed, is independentof
the actions of financial intermediaries as Fama (1980) and
King and Plosser (1984) assume, then there would appear
to be no justification on monetary policy grounds for any
special regulation of the banking sector." The appropriate
conduct of monetary policy in an environment also is
Economic Review I Fall 1988straightforward. Since variations inthe monetary base have
no effect on real variables, the monetary authority need
concern itself only with achieving price stability.
However, if bank loans or deposits are in some sense
special, then the optimal design policy becomes a more
complicated task. From both sides of the banking sector's
balance sheet there seem to be good theoretical reasons to
believe monetary policy disturbances will not be neutral,
even in equilibrium models of the business cycle. Policy
analysis requires a better understanding of the role of both
bank lending and bank provision of the medium of ex-
change. Without such an understanding, we are unable to
evaluate alternative policy proposals.
ENDNOTES
1. By "banks," we mean financial intermediaries whose
liabilities provide transaction services.
2. For a more general summary of the real effects of
monetary policy, see Blanchard (1987).
3. This superneutrality result does not strictly hold in a
model like King and Plosser's which incorporates an
endogenous labor supply decision unless the labor sup-
ply decision also depends only on ex-ante real interest
rates. However, King and Plosser ignore this potential
effect as empirically unimportant.
4. For a model of bank runs, see Diamond and Dybvig
(1983).
5. As will be discussed in Section III, Bernanke's evi-
dence also is consistent with the view that it is bank
lending that is the key channel through which banking
disturbances affect real economic activity.
6. Assets used to carry out intergenerational trades need
not, however, bear much resemblance to money For
some examples from nonmonetary economies, seeWalsh
(1983).
7. Since the large intermediary can earn a certain rate of
return through diversification, the type of asymmetric in-
formation problem between bank and depositors ana-
lyzed by Leland and Pyle (1977) does not arise.
8. A recent paper by Williamson (1987) attempts to incor-
porate his earlier work on intermediaries into a real busi-
ness cycle model.
9. For a discussion of banks and regulatory policy, see
Furlong and Keeley (1988)
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